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JUNE, 1930

Number 4

Republican in Form
A question of more than passing interest is suggested
by the recent case of Ohio v. Park District, decided by the
United States Supreme Court on March 12, 1930, and reported in the Advance Sheets of the Supreme Court Reporter, in Volume 50, page 228. It has provoked the present
inquiry because one of the points raised was not, and apparently never has been, decided by the Court.
Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio
provides that: "No law shall be held unconstitutional and
void by the Supreme Court without the concurrence of all
but one of the judges, except in an affirmance of a judgment
of the Court of Appeals declaring a law unconstitutional
and void". The validity of a certain statute was sustained
by the Court of Common Pleas and by the Court of Appeals.
In the Supreme Court five justices declared the act unconstitutional, but two held for its validity and by virtue
of the Section of the Constitution above quoted, the validity
became established.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, this
provision of the state Constitution was alleged to be repugnant to Section 4 of Article IV of the United States
Constitution. This section provides: "The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic violence".
The Supreme Court denied its jurisdiction to decide
such a question on the ground that it is a political question
and properly belongs to Congress. This is the invariable
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reply to such questions, and brings to mind similar denials
of jurisdiction in cases involving the choice between two
opposing state governments;1 initiative and referendum
provisions in a state constitution ;2 and referendum on
legislative apportionment.8
It may be of interest to note that although there is
no express provision of the Federal Constitution committing
this duty to Congress, the Court has been consistently
courteous in refusing to invade the field of a question it has
assigned to Congress. The numerous cases declaring Acts
of Congress unconstitutional are evidence of the fact that
Congress does not always return the courtesy.
The modesty of the Court in this respect compels the
inquiring mind to seek elsewhere for the answer to a question which is of the highest interest and importance.
The cases and text books are regrettably reticent on
the question of what constitutes a Republican Form of
Government. The Courts mainly content themselves with
presenting a host of ingenious arguments to prove that it
is the duty of Congress, and beyond the powers of the
Court as a political question. They do not offer any helpful
suggestions to Congress on which to base its determination,
but prefer to let the question severely alone.
It has been suggested that all of the States had Governments when the Constitution was adopted. In all of
them the people participated to some extent through representatives variously chosen. They were accepted without
change when the Constitution was adopted, so they may
be regarded as evidence of what the Constitution contemplated as republican in form, and proposed to preserve.'
This idea, however, seems rather foreign to the intent
of the framers of the Constitution. They refused to finally
adopt the provision in the form previously agreed upon
guaranteeing to each state "a Republican Constitution and
1Luther
2

v. Borden, 7 How. 1.

P.acific States T. & T. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118.

8Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565.
'Story, Commentaries. Sec. 1813, n.; Minor v. Happersett, 21
Wall. 175,
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its existing laws". Gouverneur Morris and William Houston instanced the objectionable features in the governments
of Rhode Island and Georgia, so the provision was deliberately omitted.5
Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786-87 had
brought the question into sharp focus before the Constitutional Convention. It was apparent that there was a
necessity for some provision giving a state the power to
call for aid when a situation went beyond its own powers
of control. The convention was reluctant, however, to
proceed too far and go to dangerous extremes in the matter
of allowing the Federal Government unbridled authority to
meddle in the internal affairs of the state. Martin of Maryland, championing the cause of State's Rights, proposed
"leaving the States to suppress rebellions themselves", and
regarded it as "a dangerous and unnecessary power". Gerry
of Massachusetts was against "letting loose the myrmidons
of the United States on a state without its consent". But
Gouverneur Morris remarked: "We are acting a very
strange part. We first form a strong man to protect us
and at the same time wish to tie his hands behind him.
The Legislature may surely be trusted with such a power
to preserve the public tranquility".6 On September 15, 1787,
the clause in its present form was agreed to by the Convention.
What then, is this Republican Form of Government
which must be preserved to the States by the United
States? What are the distinguishing characteristics, or
essential features, the absence of which brings conviction
that a government is no longer republican in form? For,
with the caution appropriate to so important a subject, it
would perhaps be better to approach the question on the
blind side, trusting to thus find it more vulnerable. Let us
first consider certain forms of government which have been
asserted to be republican in form, then certain other forms
which are not considered to be such. From the vantage
5The

Making of the Constitution, (Warren), p. 601.
eMaking of the Constitution, p. 601.
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point thus obtained we may be able to discover the object
of our search.
Four important factors have received sufficient recognition to deserve our further consideration in an effort to
discover which, if not all, are the essential characteristics
of a republican form of government. They are:
First: The existence of the ultimate sovereignty in
the body politic, or as it has been so tritely phrased:
"Government of the people, by the people".
Second: The expression of the popular will by the
method of representation, either personal or political.
Third: The subservience of the entire group to the
will of a majority of the body politic, or majority rule.
Fourth: The independence of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Departments of Government.
Collier's New Dictionary (1929 Edition) informs us
that the noun "republic" means: "A state or country in
which the supreme power is vested in representatives elected by popular vote". It may safely be assumed that the
principle of representation in government is one of the
characteristics which distinguish a republican form from
other forms of government. But more than this, we note
that the representatives are to be "elected by popular vote".
This qualification, in further explanation of that suggested
by the meaning of the term "representative", imports a
constituency in which resides the power to create representatives, or the ultimate sovereignty.
Nor is this latter qualification without importance to
the inquiry, in view of the fact that government by representation was a familiar principle long before the doctrine
of sovereign rights in the people was anything more than
a treasonable utterance. The messengers who bore the
King's prerogative, were called his representatives, and
were vested, pro tanto, with supreme power; yeL , 92
stretch of the imagination could such a representative government be called republican, even in form.
The existence of the governing power in a representation of the ultimate popular sovereignty, molds the idea into
a form similar to that conceived by Madison in the Fed-
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eralist 7 as the ideal aimed at by the framers of the Constitution through the clause in question, when he says:
"If we resort, for a criterion, to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may
bestow that name on, a government which derives all its
powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the
people, and is administered by persons holding their offices
during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be
derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to
the rank of republicans and claim for their government
the honorable title of 'republic'. It is sufficient for such
a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people, and that
they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just
specified; otherwise every government in the United States,
as well as every other popular government that has been
or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to the
constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of
the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by
the people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate
himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode
of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate
branches of the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended
to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the
legislative and executive departments, to a period of years.
According to the provisions of most of the constitutions,
as well as according to the most respectable and received
opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure o
good behavior".
7No. XXXVIII.
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The principle of representation is insisted upon to distinguish the republican form of government from the
democracy, in which the people act solely as a collective
group of individuals and not through representatives. The
idea of representation and the idea of democracy are thus
incompatible and the name of "representative democracy"
sometimes applied is an anomaly.
Since representation is seen to play so important a
part, it would be well, perhaps, to examine the principles
and history of government by representation, and to learn
whether or not the United States Government may have
been considered by the Constitution makers as the paragon,
republican in form.
History tells us that various theories of sovereignty
have existed and received the habitual obedience of the
individuals subject to their application. These have been
called governments, and may be divided into several great
classes, characterized in the following way:
I. Ideocracy (or theocracy) in which the people are
governed by a god or gods, of whose wishes priests are the
supposed exponents. Superstitious belief in the superhuman
power of these persons secures them their office until it is
indicated by some oracle, revelation, or other manifestation
of the divine that a change should be made. Ideocracy is
among the very oldest forms of government, and its
theories persist in varied forms in many of the countries
of today, although enlightened thought has, to a great
extent, demonstrated its impracticability for the administration of temporal affairs, and has confined it largely to
ecclesiastical fields.
11. Monarchy, or government by one head, who in his
own person is the State, and whose authority over all is
supreme and absolute in that he is accountable to none.
III. Aristocracy or government by a limited class,
usually greatly in the minority, in which the ruling class
exercises absolute sovereignty over the remainder, without
accountability to any, although the members of the ruling
class are accountable, as individuals, to the class as a whole.
IV. Democracy, or government by a whole people of
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themselves; in which the absolute sovereignty exists only
in the whole people. The relation of subject and ruler still
appears, but each member is a subject, and at the same
time an integral part of the Government. Theoretically,
this form furnishes the most complete protection to the
individual, since no action can be taken to affect him as
an individual, until he has taken part therein as a part of the
collective mass which wields the sovereign power. Diffusion of the sovereignty proportionately increases the
justness of a government, but in like proportion decreases
its efficiency.
The pure democracy is the most logically perfect government yet conceived. The more closely any governmental
system approaches to the principle of responsiveness to
individual expression, the more nearly perfect it becomes.
Such a government, however, when applied to large groups
becomes too cumbersome for efficient operation because
no effective method has ever been devised to accurately
ascertain and carry out the popular will on every question
arising in a large and widely scattered group. Some system
of concentration is necessary, and in the process of concentration, some of the effect of the principle ot individual expression is lost.
The expression "the whole people", is only relatively
correct, for the whole people never have and never could
participate actually in their government, except under an
ideal state of things as yet unconceived. The pure democracy would require the nonexistence of distinctions
based upon social condition, color, sex, property or intellectual capacity. Incapacity to meet the requirements imposed upon the right to vote or otherwise exercise the
rights of citizenship, necessarily denies to a large class the
right of any participation in government. To this extent
the actual government falls short of theoretical democracy;
and becomes difficult to distinguish from the Aristocracy.
The difference is more to be found in the spirit which
actuates the definition of citizenship than by the enumeration of rulers and subjects. The latter form is based upon
a supposed hereditary distinction between higher and lower
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classes of humanity, and embodies and perpetuates such
distinctions in its visible forms and customs. The former
is based upon the equality of all of the individuals who
compose it, and purports to represent the community more
perfectly insofar as its requirements may and do extend to
and embrace groups which were previously excluded from
participation in Government. All modern forms of government may be classified in one or the other of these
forms, or are more commonly, a combination of some of
the features of each.
These divisions were used by Aristotle, and have been
regarded by every constitutional authority since his time,
although they are subject to constant attack on philosophic
grounds. For the purpose of this discussion they may be
regarded as substantially correct, for its limited field precludes a thorough examination of such objections.
The democratic form of government in the fullest and
most logical state ever actually used, is exemplified by the
Greek republics, of which the Athenian is perhaps the most
typical representative. The freemen of the state enacted
their laws directly, without the intervenion of other political'-devices, to an extent to which history records no
parallel. All important questions of a public nature were
discussed and determined by public meetings of the freemen
which were held almost weekly. This general devotion to
public life instead of to the strugglefor daily sustenance
and pecuniary advantage would be a practical impossibility
in the life of today, when only a partial representation of
the electorate can be cajoled to cease their labors for annual or semi-annual elections. But it is more readily understood when we remember that most of the labor of that
day was performed by slaves.
In these public gatherings of a people exercising the
right of self government, the ideal democracy found its
first and most nearly perfect demonstration. The Athenian
youth over twenty years of age could feel himself a part of
the sovereignty and personally exercise all of those duties
which now devolve on the legislature in a republican form
of government. The characteristics of a democracy, in
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which the majority rule must govern, were fully developed,
and every citizen had the right to propose, discuss, and vote
upon any law or other governmental action.
The government of the people by the people themselves is possible however, only when the territory of the
republic is composed of one city, or is in so small a compass
that citizens can readily meet at stated and frequent intervals, and at times of unforseen contingencies can be called
together at the sound of a trumpet. A further condition of
such form of government is the necessary leisure on the
part of the citizen to devote his thoughts and time to
public questions,-a leisure possible only if the want of
the members of the community are but few and simple,
and the laws to be enacted and enforced but few in number,
or if the great bulk of the labor necessary to produce the
commodities consumed by the people is performed by a
subject race or class. For nations having an extensive
territory, great variety and division of employment, and
that intense competition in every human activity which
make exclusive devotion to one business of life a condition
of success, the form of democracy as the Athenians had it
is utterly impracticable; such a people must, if they desire
to preserve the democratic idea, do the work of legislation
by deputies or representatives, and the business of administration by officers elected or appointed from time to time
to administer this or that trust, and for the time being to
wield this or that power.
Representative government, therefore, is not an original organic form, but a machinery necessitated by modern
civilization and requirements of life to make democratic
government possible,--a machine more or less perfect in
proportion to its success in realizing the democratic idea of
government by the people for the people.
Wherever in modern times the democratic form of government has been adopted-with the single exception of
the case of some of the mountain cantons of Switzerlandthe sovereign legislative power of the community has been
delegated to representatives; and the power left to the
voter is generally only the selection of members of the
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representative body. So little did the ancients realize the
fact of a representative system of government that even
Aristotle said that a state should not be too large nor too
small; it should not be so large but that all the citizens
can be acquainted with each other, "for how else can they
elect their magistrates ?"
The representative system is the modern form of
democracy, and as such, a glance at the history of representation will enable us to account for the existence of our
present method of election.
Montesquieu was right in finding the germ of modern
representative systems in the forests of Germany; those
sturdy Teutons who became the conquerors of Rome were
the originators of the thought, "no taxation without representation". Their folkmote was not a city rabble, but a
staid gathering of friends and neighbors, which not only
satisfied the postulate of Aristotle, but went further, in
never becoming even so numerous as to induce confusion.
"To facilitate", says Mr. Chas. Goepp, in his admirable
essay "On the Legal Organization of the People" the execution of his edicts, Charlemagne devised an expedient,
which, possibly without any such design, constitutes the
most important epoch in the history of the institutions
under which laws are made. At stated intervals he sent
messengers from his court into the counties, to confer
with the counts and the people, enforce the render of services, collect such taxes as were then imposed,-most of
them payable in kind,-promulgate the laws, hold courts,
hear grievances, and either redress or report them to headquarters. This measure altered the county from a mere
geographical division into a self-acting municipal institution. The messengers were received by the. most influential inhabitants of the county, coming from every part of
it, who thus constituted a natural representation of the
people. The question of taxation kept alive the consciousness of a common interest as against the government. The
coming of the envoys was the occasion for discussing, in
this plenary assembly, all the affairs of the shire, for disposing of appeals from the hundred courts, and for ad-
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dressing the king on subjects of universal interest. A
connecting link between the hundreds and the king's court
was established on the one hand, and on the other, the vast
unwieldly ship of state was divided, like a modern steamer,
into innumerable water-tight compartments, each of which
could outlive the scuttling of any of the others and assist
in floating them.
The empire of Charlemagne, as an empire, was short
lived, because his successors lacked the ability required to
perpetuate the throne. But the institutions on which that
throne was reared, and which are really his handiwork, survived for centuries, and furnished the vital germ of those
under which we are now living. The founders of England
and Hungary regarded the great Frankish chieftain as the
highest authority in matters of government, and organized
the shires on the plan of Charlemagne.
On the continent, during the Middle Ages, the diets
were meetings principally of the aristocratic classes, and
not until the thirteenth century were the cities allowed to
send a delegation of their leading burghers. The growing
power, however, of the cities forced a recognition to representation, and though reluctantly granted, it was the entering wedge to the representation of the third estate. In
England, the system of representation developed, as Hallam
observes, partly from the fears entertained by the sovereign
of the influence of a multitude who assumed the privilege of
coming in arms to the appointed place. Long before the
period referred to, we know that the earliest English kings
not only acted on the advice and consent of certain persons eminently powerful among their subjects, but stated
the concurrence of such persons in the official promulgations of the royal will, as giving it strength and validity,
from their constitutional authority. Whatever were the
qualifications of the advisers who surrounded the early
Norman kings, they must have been expected to be numerous, since Westminister Hall was built by Rufus for
their reception. The term Parliament was first used toward
them in the reign of Henry III. "If there be any date in
the early period of English History", says Mr. Cox, "which
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above all others deserves to be implanted in the memory
of Englishmen, it is the year 1265,-the forty-ninth year
of the reign of Henry II. Historians and antiquarians are
agreed in referring to that epoch the earliest parliament of
lords, knights, citizens, and burgesses. Before that time,
indeed, there had been held many great councils of the
nation, but none, so far as extant records show, in which
the counties and boroughs of England were represented
together"."
In the reigns of William the Conqueror and his immediate successors, councils were frequently convened, and
were attended by the principal men of the kingdom,bishops, abbots, earls and barons. The councils convened
by the Conqueror, ordinarily at Easter, Whitsuntide, and
Christmas, acted rather in an administrative than in a legislative capacity. The chief business of the councils of William I., so far as we have now records of them, related to
matters of executive government, such as the grant of local
charters and the decision of questions of title to land. The
same observation applies to the reign of Rufus and several
succeeding kings.
The first instance of a representative assembly is supposed to have been in 1213, the fifteenth year of King John.
Writs were addressed to the sheriff of each county commanding him to cause four discreet knights of the country
to attend the king at Oxford to consult with him on the
affairs of the kingdom. No provision was made for the
representation of boroughs.
This transaction took place two years before the
Magna Charta, which was granted by the king at a great
assembly of barons, held at Runnymede, in the seventeenth
year of John (A. D. 1215). One of the provisions of this
celebrated treaty provided that "no scutage which shall
be imposed in the kingdom, except by common council of
the kingdom, except to ransom the king's body, and to
knight his eldest son, and to then marry his eldest daughter,
and for this there shall be reasonable aid". The articles in
8Cox's Antient Parliamentary Elections, London, 1868.
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which this passage occurs constituted the original treaty
between John and the barons of Runnymede, and are entitled "These are the articles which the barons require and
the king concedes". The charter itself provides how this
council is to be constituted "for holding the common council of the kingdom, for assessing an aid otherwise than in
the three cases aforesaid, or for assessing a scutage, we
will cause to be summoned the archbishops, bishops, abbots,
earls, and greater barons by our letters under seal; and,
moreover, we will cause to be summoned in general by our
sheriffs and bailiffs, all those who hold of us in capite, at
a certain day, to wit: at the expiration of forty days at
least, and to a certain place; and in all letters of that summons we will express the cause of summons; and the summons being so made, the business shall proceed at the appointed day according to the counsel of those who shall be
present, although all the persons summoned do not attend". It will be seen that this council was to be convened
for fiscal purposes only. The prelates, earls, and greater
barons were to be summoned singly by royal writ, just
as the members of the House of Lords are to this day.
The tenants in chief only are to receive a collective
summons by the sheriffs and bailiffs. But in the next reign
the principles of representation received a great development, much more nearly in accordance with the old traditions of popular government in the Saxon times. For
example in the year following the grant of Henry's charter
(12 Henry If., A. D. 1226), a great council was held at
Lincoln, which was attended by the representative knights
of several counties, who accused the sheriff of infractions
of the charters. The manner in which the knights were
chosen shows that they are regarded as representatives.
At a previous assembly of magnates at Winchester, the
crown had agreed to call the Lincoln assembly; and for that
purpose writs were directed to the sheriffs of certain counties, directing the election of four knights of each county
by the milites and good men (probi homines) thereof. This
assembly was called only for a special, though very important, purpose, namely, to examine complaints against
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the sheriffs of violating the charters. The Lincoln assembly was not a complete parliament in the modern sense,
but shows a great advance beyond the narrow system of
representation contemplated by John's charter. It is remarkable that the electors included all persons comprised
under the wide designation of probi hoinines.9 In the thirtyeighth year of Henry III., A. D. 1254, the first representative council was assembled for the purpose of granting an
aid. The sheriffs of each county were commanded "to
cause to appear before the king's council, at Westminister,
two legal and discreet knights, whom each county court
was to elect for this purpose in the stead of the same". As
yet there was no provision for the representation of the
boroughs.
Four years later, by the "Provisions of Oxford" (A. D.
1258) in a parliament, it was provided that in every county
four discreet and legal knights should be chosen to inquire
into grievances, and, upon oath, make a report on the same,
which report, sealed with their own seal, and that of the
county, was to be personally delivered by the sheriff to the
parliament, to be holden at Westminister on the octaves
of Michaelmas next ensuing.
We come now to the memorable occasion when the
representation as well of boroughs as of counties appears
to have been first instituted. in 1264 King Henry was
taken prisoner. In the following year a parliament was
held in London in obedience to writs of summons addressed
in the king's name to a numerous body of barons, prelates,
abbots, and other dignitaries, and also to the sheriffs of
counties, and to various cities and boroughs. The sheriffs
of each county throughout England were commanded to
cause two knights of the more loyal and discreet knights
of the several counties to attend at the time appointed. In
the same manner summons were addressed to the citizens
of York, the citizens of Lincoln, and to the other boroughs
of England, to send on the aforesaid form "two of their
more discreet and approved citizens and burgesses"; and
9Cox's

Antient Parliamentary Elections, p. 66.
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similar writs were sent to the Cinque Ports, which are addressed to their barons and bailiffs, which command them
to send four of their loyal and discreet men to treat with
their prelates and magnates, and grant an aid-"
We thus arrive at the great epoch of the history of
English representative institutions, of the summons of a
complete representative assembly. The earlier parliament
included only the barons and great men of the kingdom,
except in the mentioned cases, when knights of the shire
were summoned. Even the provisions of Oxford, which
added greatly to the political power of the people, made no
provision for the representation of towns. To ascer-tain the
mode in which the election was conducted we must refer to
the returns of the sheriffs of that period. They state the
elections to have taken place in "full county court", or by
the assent of the whole county. The right to vote seems
to have been much more general at that early period of
English history than it is now, notwithstanding the recent
reform acts; and this right was restricted at a much later
period than the period of the Third Henry (1216-1272),
when all freemen were entitled to the suffrage, to wit: the
statute of 8 Henry VI. (A. D. 1429), which limited the
right of suffrage to those who are commonly called fortyshilling freeholders, and this limitation of the right of
suffrage was the direct cause of the decline of the influence
of Parliament from that period down to the time of James i.
In 1295 (23 Edward I.) we come to another chief epoch
in the history of parliamentary institutions, the regular
and general representation of cities and boroughs. In that
year the sheriffs received writs for the election of two
knights of every county, and two citizens of each city, and
two burgesses of each borough therein, with full and sufficient power for themselves and "communities" of their
several counties, cities, and boroughs to do what should be
ordained of the common council in the premises.
The reasons assigned by the king for convening this
assembly are very remarkable. He recognizes explicitly
10Cox's Antient Parliamentary Elections, p. 68.
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the right of the whole community to be consulted on matters affecting their common interests. The commencement
of the writs to the prelates runs thus: "Whereas, a most
just law, established by the provident circumspection of
sacred princes, exhorts and ordains that what affects all by
all should be approved; so also it declares evidently that
common dangers should be met by remedies provided in
common". He then refers to a contemplated invasion by
the King of France, with a very great fleet and multitude
of armed men, with which he is about to attack the kingdom and its inhabitants, and if his power correspond to the
detestable purpose of his conceived iniquity (which may
God avert), to utterly efface the English language from the
earth. The writ then proceeds to command the attendance of the prelates and clergy "to treat, ordain, and determine with us and the rest of the prelates, chief men,
and'other inhabitants of our realm, how dangers and designs
of this kind shall be obviated"."
The theoretical measure of the efficiency of any representative body is the degree of its responsiveness to the
prevailing popular sentiment. It is only in its approach to
this ideal state that the principle of government by representation can find any justification in logic and reason. A
governing body, though it be called super-representative,
which does not accurately reflect the popular will of the
moment, is no more entitled to respect, from a purely
logical viewpoint, as a popular government, than was the
"divine right" theory of the French Monarchs and the
Stuarts.
But idealism can function only in the presence of idealism and under ideal conditions which the logician alone
can invent to prove his theories. Certainly the loosely
bound Confederation of infant states in 1787, with their
widely differing social and economic conditions, jealously
watchful, each of her neighbor, and every one of all, did
not present exactly the proper, ideal conditions of intelligence, unselfishness, and national consciousness essential
"1Sterne's Representative Government.
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to complete idealism. A compromise of some sort with
idealism was expedient, and a "compromise of sorts" was
the result. Alexander Hamilton tells us that:2 "The plan
in all its parts, was a plan of accommodation".1
Looking back upon the history of those times and
circumstances, our admiration is excited not only by the
fact that they framed a government so well, but that they
framed any acceptable and lasting structure at all. Groping,
as it were, in the mists that shrouded the dawn of our
present day conceptions of popular government, without
the lamp of any successful and lasting example of a truly
representative form of government to guide their feet and
set them in the right paths, they nevertheless evolved the
most successful structure known up to that time, and for
some time thereafter.
One factor, perhaps- more than all the others, contributed to, and made possible their success. This has
been attributed to varied sources, including, the lack of
other forms of amusement; the efforts of the phamphleteers; the existence of a real crisis in public affairs; and by
some even the medium of Divine inspiration, though it has
been noted that the claims to representation of this constituency in the convention, were negligible. Whatever the
cause, all authorities seem to agree that at this period of
American political history, statesmanship was enjoying a
heyday unknown to any subsequent times. Our assemblies,
and indeed, our entire political life was enlightened by a
galaxy of intellectual stars, to whom the necessary unselfish
devotion to the greatest good of the greatest number was
their only toga, and not a fancy dress costume to be donned
only before elections or other festivals of greater or less
national importance.
Not alone the names of these men, but their very doctrines were practically household words, and passed freely
current in the homilies of widely separated communities.
They were the table-talk of poor and rich alike, and every
man, however humble his rank or station, had a stock of
12Elliott's Debates, vol. ii, p. 273.
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the maxims of statecraft hardly to be found today outside
of the public libraries.
Better fitted, though these people may have been, for
intelligent self-rule, than the indifferent masses of today,
yet even they were not ready for idealistic conditions. In
those trying times when the National Government presented the ludicrous spectacle of an infant in arms opposing its
full grown rivals, the states, a truly representative form of
government which accurately reflected every change of
popular fancy, would have been an awkward fledgling foredoomed to an early demise. The crying need was for strong
minds in the Presidential chair, in the Supreme Court, and
in the National Assembly, to protect this new creation for
the period of the development of its powers, and to educate
the people to the advantages of a national consciousness.
In the Convention, Madison, with a wisdom beyond the
experience of the times, advocated a policy which should
avoid the dangers of a too responsive representation, yet
should embody substantial safeguards against a possible
oligarchy of the State governments, by providing for a
popular election of the House-of Representatives. On the
other hand, factions were present even in those days, and
there was need to make provision against abuses by a majority united through common interest in the more thickly
populated communities, against the minority. To guard
the interests of the latter, a system of diffusion of power
was needed. The protection he proposed was: "The enlarging of the sphere (by the formation of a House of
Representatives), and thereby dividing the communities
into so great a number of interests and parties that, in the
first place, a majority will not be likely at the same moment
to have a common interest separate from that of the whole,
or of the minority; and in the second place, that in case
they should have such an interest, they may not be so
apt to unite in pursuit of it. It was incumbent upon us,
then, with that view, to frame a republican system on such
a scale, and in such a form, as will control all the evils
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which have been experienced"."3
A government purporting to be representative must
satisfy the first test by providing a system of selection
which will insure equable representation of each natural or
economic interest found in the body politic. The next, and
equally important test of its worthiness, is its responsiveness to prevailing popular sentiment on every public issue.
The assembly which is most responsive to prevailing
popular thought of its constituency on matters of general
interest, is the most easily justifiable from a philosophic
viewpoint. The expedient of popular referendum on all
legislation is coming more and more into popular favor for
this purpose. The merit of this system is plainly apparent
from a theoretical view, yet it has the very considerable
disadvantages of being both expensive and cumbersome.
Frequency of elections is the most effective method of
reminding an assembly of its obligations in the matter of
responsiveness, yet this is subject to the same objections
if carried to extremes. Alexander Hamilton said: "As it is
essential to liberty that the government in general should
have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly
essential that the branch of it under consideration should
have an immediate dependence upon and an intimate sympathy with the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy
can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of
frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose
does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculaThe convention after much consideration chose
tion"."
biennial elections.
One of the respects in which our present'form of party
government falls most seriously short of the potentialities
blocked out for it by the constitution, is the manner in
which candidates for office are chosen. But like most
others, this is a defect not of the plan itself but the method
by which the plan is executed. Our popular vote is too
13Elliott's Debates, vol.
"4Federalist No. LI.

V,

p. 151.
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often a popularity vote, and the only real issue, the ability
of the candidate to fill the office which he seeks, .is lost in
the fog of party issues and the tumult of huzzahs raised
by a well trained and well paid army of professional henchmen and calculated to imitate popular acclaim with sufficient success to deceive the mass voters incapable of uninstructed thought.
In theory, representatives are not considered as a class.
To carry out their proper function in the scheme, they must
be regarded as the people themselves on a reduced scale.
The Statesman Mirabeau phrased this thought well in a
speech in the assembly in 1789 when he said: "That a representative body is to the nation what a chart is for the
physical configuration of its soil: in all its parts, and as a
whole, the representative body should at all times present
a reduced picture of the people-their opinions, aspirations,
and wishes, and that representation should bear the relative proportion to the original precisely as a map brings
before us mountains and dales, rivers and lakes, forests and
plains, cities and towns. The finer should not be crushed
out by the more massive substance, and the latter not be
excluded; the value of each element is dependent upon its
importance to the whole and for the whole. The proportions are organic, the scale is national"."
Two faults are apparent in our present system-the
use of two artificial parties, and a geographical, instead of
an ecomonic, districting of representatives.
It is readily apparent that each time the principle of a
majority is employed, its efficiency as a true expression of
popular will is reduced, until cumulative minorities may
exceed the total of the votes represented and favoring the
measure. Government by a majority is sound in principle
in a popular sovereignty, but it must not be forgotten that
the principle defeats the purpose if carried beyond the first
stage. The real purpose is government by majority, employing the principle of representation as an expedient.
The rule of subtraction obtains, and a bare majority of a
-5Sterne's Representative Government, p. 50.
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bare majority becomes a minority of the original quantity,
and the purpose of majority rule is .defeated.
But the question goes deeper than mere matters of
majority and minority. No government can be said to be
truly representative when it permits the actual exclusion
of any minority from all participation or voice in the affairs
of government, no matter how perfect may be its design
in other respects. Surely it is even less adequate when it
is hampered by the struggle of two artificial, parties for
control, and the still more artificial division into meaningless districts, determined solely by population statistics and
geographical location.
The varying occupations and pursuits of a people, the
distribution of population, and the matter of supply and
consumption of necessities are regulated by physical and
natural laws, the operation of which is susceptible of more
or less certain observation. These form the real basis for
the diversity of human opinions on any given subject. Is it
not logical that they should form the best basis for the
selection of representatives who are to most nearly express
the true sentiment of their constituency? Any given geographical district cannot fail to be composed of many natural classes of individuals, whose interests and opinions are
so diversified as to be practically antagonistic. The representative who can combine in one person these antagonistic
interests so as to promote the interests of each class, does
not exist, and it would be idle to seek for such an illogical
creature. It is better to alter a system which requires him.
To those who will agree that incalculable difficulties
may be placed in the way of the business of law-making,
the best answer is that incalculable and insurmountable
difficulties should be placed in the way of the business of
law-making as it is now conducted, such difficulties in fact
as will compel a complete change. The two-party system
has so restricted the enactment of legislation as to leave
the balance of power in the hands of a small group of
independents. This is indeed a far cry from the rule of the
pure majority regarded as so sacred to the cause of a just,
popular government by the idealists of the Athenian de-

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
mocracy and by the best minds among the convention delegates in this country.
Representation'based upon occupational or other economic divisions is readily seen to be more representative
of group thought than any geographical system of districting. The presence of a nucleus for this system in our existing assemblies is purely a matter of accident, yet happily
it seems to exist in practically every one. It would be
easily possible, under our present system, for the entire
membership of an assembly to be drawn from the ranks of
one occupation. They might be all farmers, all laborers,
all tradesmen, or all professional men, if each geographical
district should happen to choose the same type, for each
district operates on the theory of complete independence of
the others in choosing its representatives. Such a body
would have to be called representative under our present
theory, yet in fact it would be far from the case. Men
most readily understand and sympathize with the problems
of other men in the same lines of endeavor, and such a body
could never be even approximately efficient and fair.
The occupational system is the basis upon which we
naturally analyze the composition of our assemblies, yet
we fail to recognize as a fundamental political fact, the
principle which we see in daily operation in every assembly
in the land. The elected legislators, actuated by common
interest and mutuality of understanding, naturally resolve
themselves into occupational groups, conducting their efforts toward legislation more in accord with these principles than by the tenents of strict party affiliation. Examples of this are readily found in the farm and labor
blocs, and other alliances of circumstance. A member from
New Jersey does not support a measure because a member
from Pennsylvania does, but if both are farmers or tradesmen, their common interest draws them to its support.
The principle is fair and reasonable, for if a majority
of the people in a State are farmers, their interests are not
accurately represented by less than a majority in the assembly, who can best understand and deal with the prob7
lems of their group. It is a logical application of the repre-
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sentative principle in majority rule.
The fourth and last characteristic which we shall consider, is the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government. We are not assisted to
any great extent by definite expositions on the subject by
any of the departments concerned, for it is a matter of
extreme delicacy for any one department to attempt to
ascribe well defined limits to the power of another department of supposedly equal authority.
The separation of these three departments was regarded by the framers thereof, as a matter of the most
vital necessity to the preservation of liberty in the structure they had created. Hamilton says in the Federalist:16
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny".
This separation does not require, in Hamilton's opinion,
an absolute divorce of functional attributes as well as
fundamental principles, but only, as he expresses it: "that
where the whole power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another
department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted". Indeed, in the following number of the
Federalist, he makes the assertion that: "unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give each
a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires as essential to a free
government, can never in practice be duly maintained"; and
again: "that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a
tyrannical concentration of all of the powers of government in the same hands".
It is the natural tendency in a republican form of government, to invest the legislative branch with powers of
far wider scope than those of the other two branches. It
'6 Federalist No. XLVI.
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was even more natural for this to happen in 1787 when the
reaction was so strong from "the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of i hereditary magistrate, supported and
fortified by a hereditary branch of the legislative authority". This was true more of the governments formed by
the individual states than that formed by the nation. Many
of the States, in their zeal to escape the clutches of one
monster, fled straight into the grasp of another, to their
sorrow when they found they had substituted a legislative
for an executive despot. In their haste to escape monarchy,
by dividing the supreme power into the numerous hands of
a legislature, they failed to note the principle that divided
power meant divided responsibility, and a responsibility sufficiently divided becomes no responsibility at all. Many of
the States were later forced at no small cost and trouble,
to devise new constitutions in which strict limitations were.
levied against the legislature to check its assumption of
despotic powers.
The legislative is the most powerful branch of Government, especially in a state, and the most likely recipient
of added powers at the hands of the people. This obtains
for the reason, among others, that it is the most numerous
branch, and susceptible of the largest field of contacts
with the people as individuals, and the closest acquaintance.
The possession of power leads naturally to the desire for
more power, and the legislative branch is in a position to
arrogate unto itself more and more powers, unless frequently checked by Constitutional authority. Had not the
United States Supreme Court, under the courageous leadership of John Marshall, pointed out the way to other courts,
by assuming unto itself the power to declare legislation unconstitutional and void, matters might soon have been in a
bad way for the cause of liberty, and the delicate system of
checks and balances so ably worked out by the founders
of oar present Government, and so essential to its preservation in republican form.
A real danger lies in disturbing this system of checks
and balances, by which the departments are confined to
their proper spheres of action, a danger of changing the
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government into a different form. Certainly the assumption, by a legislature, of a greatly augmented sphere of authority, would upset the balance, and tend strongly to the
exercise of despotic power by an assembly in which the
responsibility is so greatly diffused over a large membership. This addition to the powers of the legislature could
be accomplished as effectively, and with the same disastrous
results to the republican form of government, by an Act
of the people in their Consitutional capacity. Constitutional
action by a people resembles democracy more than republican government, and a democracy is not the less republican in form than an aristocracy. An act taking away the
veto power of the Executive Department, would have the
same effect as one removing or restricting the power of the
judiciary to protect the public as individuals, from the
operation of unconstitutional legislation; either would
greatly add to the powers of the legislative branch and
tend toward the vesting of despotic power in that body.
These powers of the executive and judicial branches are
both intended as checks on the legislative branch, and the
checks are as important to a republican form of government, as are the balances.
The provision of the Ohio Constitution previously
quoted, unquestionably operates as a serious restraint upon
the power of the court to defeat unconstitutional legislation, because it abrogates the principles of majority rule
upon which the Courts most consistently operate in deciding cases. It serves its undoubtedly intended purpose in
lessening the number of instances in which decisions of
invalidity might be made. This enhances the power of the
legislature to enact legislation of doubtful constitutionality,
and to that extent, violates the principles herein asserted to
be essential to a government republican in form.
JOS. F. INGHAM

